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Peter F. Nascenzi 
ABSTRACT—American courts have long struggled with categorizing 
municipalities. They treat municipalities sometimes as private corporations, 
sometimes as governmental bodies, and sometimes as something in 
between. This uncertainty provides a shaky foundation for local 
government law and hampers its development. Local governments are not 
sure of their powers, and states are unable to create a comprehensive vision 
of municipal governance. When federal law is involved, the situation is 
muddled further. 
In FTC v. Phoebe Putney, the Supreme Court’s application of the state 
action doctrine unnecessarily injected federal antitrust law into the 
relationship between states and municipalities. The state action doctrine 
exempts states from antitrust liability and is only sometimes applicable to 
municipalities. Though ostensibly applying a “foreseeability” test to 
determine whether a municipality benefits from the doctrine, the Supreme 
Court instead pigeonholed municipal power into a narrow conception of 
municipalities’ role in American governance. This narrowed foreseeability 
test not only on its face constricts states’ ability to delegate certain 
functions to municipalities, but also creates constraining uncertainty as to 
which delegations of state power to municipalities will run afoul of federal 
antitrust law. Accordingly, this Note analyzes Phoebe Putney as an erosion 
of municipalities’ ability to perform governmental functions—to promote 
the health, safety, and welfare of the community—and as denying 
municipalities a vibrant role in the American federal system. 
 
AUTHOR—J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2016; 
A.B., magna cum laude, Georgetown University, 2008. I am particularly 
thankful for the guidance and encouragement of Professor Nadav Shoked 
through every step of this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of the 
Northwestern University Law Review for their careful edits and feedback, 
especially Andrew Beatty, Brenna Helppie-Schmieder, Michael Meneghini, 
W. Tyler Perry, and Megan Stride. 
NASCENZI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:46 PM 




I.	 THE COURT’S DECISION IN FTC V. PHOEBE PUTNEY ................................................. 967	
II.	LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS ................................................. 968	
A.	 The Role of Local Governments in the Federal System ................................. 968	
B.	 Federal Antitrust Law and Development of the State Action Doctrine .......... 973	
C.	 The State Action Doctrine as Applied to Municipalities ................................ 975	
D.	 Application of the State Action Doctrine in Phoebe Putney .......................... 978	
III.	THE IMPACT OF PHOEBE PUTNEY ON THE ABILITY OF STATES TO EXERCISE 
THEIR GOVERNMENTAL POWERS THROUGH MUNICIPALITIES ................................ 981	
A.	 The Development of Contemporary Municipal Law ...................................... 982	
B.	 Phoebe Putney as an Intrusion into State-Made Local Government Law ..... 985	




In FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court 
handed local government a defeat and denied municipalities a rightful place 
in the American federal system. By holding that a Georgia hospital 
authority could not enjoy immunity from federal antitrust law by virtue of 
the state action doctrine,2 the Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty 
County was treated more as a private corporation than as an exerciser of 
government power, despite Georgia law expressly establishing hospital 
authorities as governmental entities that provide for the health of their 
citizens.3 Several commentators have written about Phoebe Putney in terms 
of its impact on the landscape of antitrust law and as an antitrust victory for 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).4 However, Phoebe Putney should 
not be viewed so much as a victory for antitrust or a defining antitrust 
decision,5 but rather as dealing a blow against local governments. 
 
1 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 
2 Id. at 1007. 
3 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-75 (2012). 
4 See, e.g., Richard M. Brunell, The Roberts Court Turn to the Left?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 
33, 33 (analyzing Phoebe Putney as part of three straight antitrust victories at the Supreme Court 
following a drought of such antitrust victories at the Supreme Court since 1993); Joanne C. Lewers & 
Robert A. Skitol, The Developing Antitrust Legacy of the Roberts Court, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 
7, 12 (analyzing Phoebe Putney as a reversal of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism concerns); Thomas B. 
Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 95 & n.148 (2013) (discussing Phoebe 
Putney within the context of the interaction between antitrust law and government regulation). 
5 It should be noted that the FTC’s victory ended up being a pyrrhic one. After the FTC’s success at 
the Supreme Court, the case ended in a settlement that did not include a force of sale. This was due to 
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The courts, including the Supreme Court, have struggled with 
categorizing local government entities. On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court has clearly pronounced that municipalities are mere creatures of the 
state, most notably in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.6 On the other hand, 
courts have struggled to apply this view uniformly when confronted with 
issues such as sovereign immunity,7 § 1983 litigation,8 the availability of 
Congress’s powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and 
perhaps most notably in the context of the federal antitrust laws. 
The Court has interpreted federal antitrust laws as including an 
exception to actions taken by the state (the state action doctrine), reasoning 
that Congress did not intend to interfere with the states’ ability to regulate 
their own economies.10 When applied to municipalities, supposed creatures 
of the state, the exception has made courts uneasy. Their status as 
instrumentalities of the state would seem to entitle municipalities to the 
exception.11 Instead, the Court has developed a test to determine when 
municipal actions are exempt from antitrust legislation, looking to whether 
the anticompetitive actions taken by the municipality are undertaken 
pursuant to a state’s own intentions. The underlying reasoning is because 
only states have immunity, the state’s intention is the deciding factor. 
Phoebe Putney marks a shift in this state action doctrine as applied to 
local governments that is properly understood not as a strengthening of 
antitrust law, but rather as an erosion of local governments’ ability to 
perform governmental functions—to promote the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community. The Supreme Court’s most recent application of 
 
Georgia’s certification of need laws. Melissa Lipman, FTC Settles Phoebe Merger Fight But Can’t 
Force Sale, LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/465927 
[http://perma.cc/2SE7-HATW]. The fact that state laws muted the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decision on Phoebe Putney Health Systems itself, though, does not undermine the fact that Phoebe 
Putney marks a shift in the Court’s state action doctrine.  
6 207 U.S. 161, 178–80 (1907). 
7 Compare Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that municipalities 
enjoy sovereign immunity when exercising traditional governmental functions), with Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities). 
8 Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) (finding that Congress did not intend for 
municipalities to be subject to liability under § 1983), with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658, 690 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape). 
9 Compare Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (finding that 
Congress’s Section Five powers did not abrogate state sovereign immunity absent a pattern of 
discrimination), with Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (finding that Congress’s Section 
Five powers abrogate state sovereign immunity to impose prophylactic measures against 
discrimination). 
10 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
11 See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 426–27 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
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the state action doctrine to local government prior to Phoebe Putney was 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.12 In Omni, the Court 
ruled that the city’s granting of a virtual monopoly to a billboard company 
was exempt from the antitrust liability because such a monopoly was a 
“foreseeable result” of the land use powers granted to the city by the state.13 
Not only did the Court in Phoebe Putney greatly narrow the “foreseeable 
result” test of Omni, but it did so in an area that is more explicitly tied to 
the police power of governments to protect and promote the health, safety, 
and welfare of the community. It is difficult to understand why a city is free 
to grant monopolies to billboard companies but not to hospitals. Indeed, 
Georgia statutes explicitly create a state “objective of providing all 
residents with access to adequate and affordable health and hospital care,”14 
which Georgia has chosen to effectuate via delegation to municipalities. 
Accordingly, the narrowing of the state action doctrine as applied to 
municipalities betrays an unwillingness of the Supreme Court to recognize 
local governments as valid governmental bodies in the federal system. In 
doing so, the Court has constrained the states’ abilities to craft local 
government policies such that municipalities can only exercise government 
functions in areas that conform to the Court’s preconceived notions of 
which powers can be granted to municipalities. 
This Note argues that Phoebe Putney implicitly circumscribed the 
powers a state may delegate to its local governments. In doing so, it will 
analyze Phoebe Putney in light of Supreme Court case law regarding local 
government as well as compare Phoebe Putney to the theories of local 
government that inform those cases. This Note, in Part I, will begin by 
describing the Court’s decision in Phoebe Putney and its treatment of the 
Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty County as private or public. Part 
II will discuss the difficulty of the Court to clearly characterize local 
governments as private or public, as well as examine the state action 
doctrine and its interplay with the private–public distinction. Part III will 
trace the development of contemporary local government law and analyze 
Phoebe Putney as an intrusion by the Court into this area of state law. 
Finally, Part IV will provide potential solutions to the Court’s decision in 
Phoebe Putney. 
 
12 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
13 Id. at 373 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985)). 
14 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (2013) (citing GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-7-75(22) (2012)). 
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I. THE COURT’S DECISION IN FTC V. PHOEBE PUTNEY 
At issue in Phoebe Putney was the purchase of a hospital by a local 
hospital authority.15 The Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty 
County—created pursuant to Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law16—
bought Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, one of two hospitals 
in the area.17 In 1990, the Authority reorganized, creating two nonprofit 
corporations for the management of the hospital: Phoebe Putney Health 
System, Inc. (PPHS) and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. (PPMH). 
The Authority leased the hospital to PPMH for forty years at $1 per year, 
giving PPMH “exclusive authority over the operation” of the hospital.18 In 
2010, PPHS entered into discussions to purchase the other hospital in the 
area, Palmyra Medical Center.19 In response to these discussions, the FTC 
filed an administrative complaint and eventually joined with the State of 
Georgia in filing suit against the Authority, the hospitals, and the 
corporations that managed them for violations of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Clayton Act.20 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
FTC’s claims for a failure to state a claim due to the state action doctrine.21 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the state action doctrine applied to the 
Authority because anticompetitive behavior was a foreseeable result of the 
powers granted to the Authority by the state.22 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, rejecting its 
expansive reading of the state action doctrine and finding that the doctrine 
did not protect the Hospital Authority.23 In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, 
the Court not only denied a more expansive reading of the state action 
doctrine, but also impliedly circumscribed the potential powers of 
municipalities. By analyzing the Authority as more analogous to a private 
 
15 Id. at 1008. 
16 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-70 to -96. 
17 Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1008. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the proposed purchase violated section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 
15 U.S.C. § 18. Id. These sections prohibit “[u]nfair methods of competition,” 15 U.S.C. § 45, and 
acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” 
15 U.S.C. § 18. 
21 The state action doctrine prevents the application of antitrust law to actions taken by a state. See 
infra Sections II.B–D. 
22 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1376 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1003 (2013). 
23 Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1007–09. 
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corporation than a public government entity,24 the Court curtailed 
municipalities’ power to exercise the police power as an instrument of the 
state and provide for the general welfare of its people.25 
Thus, while ostensibly an antitrust decision expounding federal 
antitrust law and the state action doctrine, Phoebe Putney actually decided 
that certain actions cannot be governmental when taken by a municipality 
regardless of the state law that shapes the municipality’s powers. The Court 
in this way has unnecessarily injected federal law into the relationship 
between states and municipalities, restricting the ability of states to shape 
their local governments and to create a vibrant role for local governments 
in the American federal system. 
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 
In order to analyze Phoebe Putney’s impact on the status of local 
government law in the American federal system, it is necessary to first 
discuss the relevant federal law. This Part will first demonstrate the 
inability of the Court to place municipalities fully within either the private 
or public spheres in light of the history of American municipalities, and its 
resultant inability to apply legal doctrines consistently. This Part will then 
trace the development of the state action doctrine in federal antitrust law, 
followed by its application to local governments, and, finally, its 
application in Phoebe Putney. 
A. The Role of Local Governments in the Federal System 
Courts have long struggled to determine the proper place of local 
governments within the U.S. constitutional system. The reasons for this are 
both structural and historical. The U.S. constitutional system contemplates 
only two levels of government: the federal government and the states. 
Thus, the Constitution does not itself create a role for local governments, 
and local governments rely on the states for their legal authority and 
 
24 The Court described the powers granted the Authority as merely “mirror[ing] general powers 
routinely conferred by state law upon private corporations.” Id. at 1011. 
25 It should be noted that the involvement of the State of Georgia in the litigation should have no 
impact on the extent of the Authority’s powers or the Court’s view of the state’s intent—the State of 
Georgia joined as a plaintiff in the original suit, but dropped from the litigation before it reached the 
Supreme Court. In the Matter of Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 31, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/111-0067/phoebe-putney-health-system-
inc-phoebe-putney-memorial [https://perma.cc/V8S4-R54W]. Akin to the way states disagree with the 
federal government over the powers reserved to the states by the Federal Constitution, localities can 
disagree with the states that created them over the limits of their powers. While the Constitution 
arguably does not create states the way states create localities, it is only natural that different levels of 
government conflict over where one’s powers end and the other’s begin.  
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existence. This was most clearly articulated in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 
when the Court stated: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the 
State as may be entrusted to them. . . . The number, nature and duration of the 
powers conferred upon these corporations . . . rests in the absolute discretion 
of the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental 
powers . . . constitutes a contract with the State within the meaning of the 
Federal Constitution.26 
However, this view of municipalities has not prevented the Supreme Court 
from interfering in the relationship between a state and its local 
governments. 
Further complicating the classification of local governments within 
the American legal system is their historical origins as corporations under 
English law. Originally, there was no legal distinction between a private 
corporation and a public corporation27 and all corporations were created in 
the same way: the sovereign would grant a charter to the newly formed 
corporation, detailing its specific powers.28 The sovereign originally could 
also revoke a charter and the powers conferred,29 though such an 
interference with municipal powers was not without its political 
consequences.30 This conception of municipal corporations carried over 
from England to the American Colonies and then into the Early Republic.31 
 
26 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). In Hunter, at issue was the merger of the cities of Pittsburgh and 
Allegheny. Id. at 174. The citizens of Allegheny objected to being merged with Pittsburgh and sued to 
prevent it. Id. at 175. The Court held that because cities are state creations, the state can unilaterally 
modify them at will. Id. at 178–79. 
27 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1082 (1980). 
28 See Robert L. Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 350, 356–57 (1906).  
29 See id. at 357–58. 
30 For example, Charles II in the late seventeenth century attempted to consolidate his 
parliamentary power by stripping powers from charters and forcing the surrender of various municipal 
charters—including that of London—in the wake of the English Civil War. The quo warranto 
proceedings against these charters—in particular against London’s—helped foment the Glorious 
Revolution. See Frug, supra note 27, at 1092–93; Gary S. De Krey, Political Radicalism in London 
After the Glorious Revolution, 55 J. MOD. HIST. 585, 588–90 (1983); J.H. Sacret, The Restoration 
Government and Municipal Corporations, 45 ENG. HIST. REV. 232, 232–33 (1930). 
31 See Frug, supra note 27, at 1095 (“In colonial America . . . most cities were not corporations at 
all. Nevertheless, the issue of city power was resolved in America as in England in the form of the 
question of corporate power.”). The origins of municipalities and their status as corporations in the 
United States are complex. See id. at 1095–99; Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of 
Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 882 (1999). For the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to 
delve into the details, except to show the origin of municipalities as corporations and the original lack 
of any distinction between private and public entities. 
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After the American Revolution, the sovereign power to create corporations 
passed to the states.32 
So too did popular disapproval of charter revocation pass to the states’ 
citizens. The Supreme Court also seemed to disapprove of the state having 
this absolute power over its chartered corporations when it decided 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,33 though the case failed to 
give municipal corporations any protection from state legislatures. New 
Hampshire had attempted to alter Dartmouth College’s charter in order to 
reinstate its ousted president and thereby control its leadership.34 Relying 
on the Contract Clause,35 the Court held that the college’s charter was a 
contract protected by the Constitution.36 However, this Contract Clause 
protection was held to apply only to private corporations—not public 
corporations—and the Court characterized Dartmouth College as just such 
a private corporation.37 Though private corporations eventually were freed 
from the charter system when general incorporation laws were adopted by 
the states,38 the vulnerability of corporations in the charter system 
essentially lives on for the descendants of public corporations—
municipalities and local governments. It is upon the background of this 
private–public distinction that Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh was decided. 
That is, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was legally allowed to 
unilaterally revoke or alter its municipalities with no protection from the 
Contracts Clause because the municipalities were public entities. 
The clear precedent of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh has not always 
been followed, though, and the courts have treated public municipalities as 
private entities in varying contexts.39 Aside from the antitrust context 
 
32 See Frug, supra note 27, at 1095–99. It is worthwhile to note that while the revocation of the 
London Charter and the Glorious Revolution that followed resulted in municipal charters gaining some 
protection from the Crown, id. at 1094, no such protection was gained from Parliament since it was 
united with cities in the struggle against the Crown: “[W]hile the rights of corporations against the King 
were resolved, their relationship to the legislature remained unsettled; the problem of city power in 
early America therefore lay in defining that relationship.” Id. at 1082. 
33 17 U.S. 518 (1819); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1780–1860, at 111–14 (1977).  
34 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 552–54. 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
36 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 651–54 (opinion of Marshall, C.J.). 
37 Id. at 640–41. 
38 See generally Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of 
Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81 (1999) (exploring the development of 
state incorporation law). 
39 See GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 235–38 (6th ed. 2015). Even in Hunter 
v. City of Pittsburgh, the Court left open the possibility of treating a municipality as a private entity in 
terms of the Contract Clause when it was acting as a proprietary owner. 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (“The 
distinction between property owned by municipal corporations in their public and governmental 
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discussed in this Note, the most striking example can be found in the 
Court’s reversal of National League of Cities v. Usery nine years later in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority on the issue of 
whether federal minimum wage laws can constitutionally be applied to 
municipalities. In National League of Cities v. Usery,40 the Court adhered 
to the characterization of municipalities in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh as 
exercisers of state governmental power. The Court struck down a federal 
statute requiring a minimum wage for employees of municipalities, finding 
that it impinged on the states’ sovereignty by affecting an area of 
traditional governmental power.41 National League of Cities was later 
overturned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which 
rejected National League of Cities’s distinction between governmental and 
proprietary functions as a basis for determining when a state’s, or its 
subdivisions’, sovereignty has been unconstitutionally infringed.42 In 
finding that municipalities were subject to federal labor laws, the Court 
thus diverged from Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh and treated the 
municipality as a private corporation. 
A similar example can be found in the context of § 1983 actions,43 in 
which the Court first held that municipalities could not be liable under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, only to later reverse course. In Monroe v. Pape,44 the 
Court found that Congress did not intend to allow suits to be brought 
against municipalities, but only against their officials.45 While the Court 
acknowledged legislative history showing the rejection of an amendment to 
explicitly provide the possibility of collecting a remedy from a “county, 
city, or parish,”46 the basis of Congress’s decision was its belief that 
“Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon 
county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the 
 
capacity and that owned by them in their private capacity, though difficult to define, has been approved 
by many of the state courts . . . and it has been held that as to the latter class of property the legislature 
is not omnipotent.” (citation omitted)). 
40 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
41 Id. at 851. 
42 Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) provides a federal cause of action against state officials for the violation 
of federal rights: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . 
subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured . . . . 
44 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
45 Id. at 187 (“[W]e are of the opinion that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal 
corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983].”). 
46 Id. at 188. 
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administration of state law.”47 Thus, the Court held that within the meaning 
of the statute, “person[s]” who could be held liable under § 1983 did not 
include municipalities.48 However, in Monell v. Department of Social 
Services,49 the Court reversed course and allowed § 1983 litigation to be 
pursued directly against municipalities.50 Again, the Court diverged from 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh and treated municipalities as both private and 
public: able to provide the color of law but not able to avail themselves of 
sovereign immunity. 
The Court has also struggled placing municipalities on either side of 
the public–private divide more generally as to Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but moving in the opposite direction as its § 1983 
jurisprudence. To abrogate sovereign immunity in pursuance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Section Five enforcement powers, remedial 
statutes must be proportional to the past unconstitutional state conduct.51 
The Court, though, has wavered as to whether conduct by cities constitutes 
evidence of past unconstitutional conduct in order to abrogate sovereign 
immunity against the state. In Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that it could not.52 However, in a 
footnote in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court rejected the argument that 
Congress could only validly exercise its Section Five powers “predicated 
solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves” 
and found municipal violations sufficient.53 Thus, the Court left it unclear 
in the Fourteenth Amendment context when it will adhere to the precedent 
of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh. 
From these cases it becomes evident that municipalities have an 
uncertain role in the American federal system. Without a clear place on 
either side of the private–public distinction, the application of various 
federal laws to municipalities remains unpredictable.54 
 
47 Id. at 190 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (statement of Rep. Poland)). 
Seemingly, Congress was concerned with issues of sovereign immunity as applied to municipalities. 
48 Id. at 191. The Court also explicitly refused to reach the constitutional question raised in the 
legislative history as to whether Congress could allow § 1983 litigation against municipalities. Id. 
49 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
50 Id. at 690. Interestingly, in a footnote, the Court noted that there was no constitutional sovereign 
immunity impediment to holding municipalities liable under § 1983, but specifically limited this 
holding “to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes.” Id. at 690 n.54.  
51 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
52 531 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2001). 
53 541 U.S. 509, 527 n.16 (2004). 
54 Courts have also struggled to determine which traits are necessary for municipal entities to be 
considered public or private. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 
681–85 (1992) (holding that free speech protections do not apply in airports, despite being publicly 
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B. Federal Antitrust Law and Development of the State Action Doctrine 
Relevant to Phoebe Putney and its impact on the role of local 
governments in the American federal system, the private–public distinction 
affects federal antitrust law through the state action doctrine. Though 
ostensibly an antitrust decision, Phoebe Putney turned on whether the 
anticompetitive behavior in question was a governmental action and thus 
exempt from antitrust law. 
The Sherman and the Clayton Acts55 constitute the basis of antitrust 
law in the United States. Both statutes are extremely vague, and it has been 
suggested that the Sherman Act “may be little more than a legislative 
command that the judiciary develop a common law of antitrust.”56 In the 
development of this common law of antitrust, the Court has established 
what has become known as the state action doctrine. In Parker v. Brown,57 
the Court first articulated the doctrine, stating that it “find[s] nothing in the 
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its 
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities 
directed by its legislature.”58 Thus, actions that would be otherwise 
prohibited by federal antitrust laws are exempt from those laws when taken 
by the state. Because this exception for state actions was carved out by the 
Court based on the Court’s understanding of congressional intent, it is not 
technically an immunity59 and thus the legal basis for claiming exception to 
federal antitrust laws cannot be based on the antitrust laws themselves.60 
Indeed, Parker itself acknowledges that “[t]he Sherman Act makes no 
mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to 
 
owned); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1946) (holding a privately held company town to 
the same free speech obligations as a municipality because of its physical similarity with a 
municipality); Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (D. Or. 1984) (using a 
seemingly formalist inquiry and regarding a city as public merely because it incorporated as a 
municipal, rather than private, corporation); Council of Orgs. and Others for Educ. About Parochiaid, 
Inc. v. Engler, 566 N.W.2d 208, 222 (Mich. 1997) (holding that a modicum of control over charter 
schools is sufficient to render them public). 
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, 12–27 (2012). 
56 PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (7th ed. 2013). 
57 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
58 Id. at 350–51. 
59 An immunity is “any exemption from . . . liability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(emphasis added). That is, an immunity prevents liability from attaching when there has been a 
violation. The state action exemption instead says that antitrust laws do not apply at all to state action. 
That is, when there is state action, there can be no violation. 
60 WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 8:7, Westlaw 
(database updated Oct. 2014). 
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restrain state action or official action directed by a state,”61 and accordingly 
sought to cabin the exception explicitly to actions undertaken by the state.62 
Complicating the doctrine, the determination of what qualifies as a 
state action is not always clear.63 When the action in question is taken by a 
state legislature or court, the determination is easy: absolute exemption. 
When the state has entrusted duties to a private party, however, the doctrine 
is at its weakest. In such cases, the Court has developed a two-part test to 
determine whether the action is exempted. First, the action in question must 
be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.”64 
Second, the private party’s implementation of that “policy must be 
‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”65 This has become known as the 
Midcal test.66 
An example of a private entity’s anticompetitive actions being exempt 
from antitrust legislation can be found in Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. United States.67 In Southern Motor Carriers, the Public 
Service Commissions of four states (Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
and Tennessee) required common carriers “to submit proposed rates to the 
relevant Commission for approval.”68 The defendants in the case were “rate 
bureaus” that collectively submitted rate proposals to the commissions on 
behalf of their members.69 The United States filed suit against the bureaus, 
alleging price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.70 
The second prong of the Midcal test was easily fulfilled: the Public 
Service Commissions (state entities) had full control over whether the rates 
would be accepted.71 Next, the court analyzed whether the rate schemes 
were in pursuance of a “clearly articulated state policy.”72 While three of 
the four states’ legislatures explicitly authorized collective ratemaking and 
were thus exempt from the Sherman Act, Mississippi’s did not.73 The Court 
 
61 317 U.S. at 351. 
62 “[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to 
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful . . . .” Id. 
63 HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 60, at § 8:7 (“The search for a bright-line test of what 
qualifies as exempt state action has been a difficult one at best.”). 
64 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting 
City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). 
65 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410). 
66 HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 60, at § 8:7. 
67 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
68 Id. at 50. 
69 Id. at 50–51. 
70 Id. at 52–53. 
71 Id. at 62. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 63. 
NASCENZI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:46 PM 
110:963 (2016) Municipalities as Nongovernments 
975 
nevertheless held that the scheme in Mississippi was also exempt from the 
Sherman Act, due to the Mississippi legislature’s delegation of discretion to 
the Commission.74 Furthermore, the Court held that a “private party acting 
pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program need not ‘point to a 
specific, detailed legislative authorization’ for its challenged conduct.”75 
Instead, “[a]s long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace 
competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure, the first prong 
of the Midcal test is satisfied.”76 
C. The State Action Doctrine as Applied to Municipalities 
In applying the state action doctrine to municipalities, the 
characterization of municipalities and their actions as private or public 
becomes crucial. After Parker and the establishment of the state action 
doctrine, municipal governments felt secure that they, too, were exempt 
from any antitrust liability.77 It followed logically from the reasoning of 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh that municipal governments would be exempt 
from antitrust, as they are state governmental bodies.78 However, in City of 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.79 in 1978 and Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder80 in 1982, the Court held that 
municipalities were not entitled to the same deference as states in federal 
antitrust law.81 
Instead, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the 
Court conditioned the exemption of a municipality from federal antitrust 
liability and cabined the exemption to the extent municipalities reflect state 
policy.82 Therefore, the state action doctrine applies to “only 
 
74 Id. at 63–64. 
75 Id. at 64 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (opinion 
of Brennan, J.)). 
76 Id. 
77 William J. Quinlan, Do Local Government Lawyers Really Have to Worry About the Antitrust 
Laws? Part I, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1985, at 20, 21. 
78 See supra Section II.A.  
79 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
80 455 U.S. 40 (1982).  
81 Quinlan, supra note 77, at 21. It appears that Congress agreed with the Court in holding 
municipal governments subject to antitrust liability by passing the Local Government Antitrust Act of 
1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34–36 (2012). The Act prohibited monetary damages in antitrust suits against local 
governments or their officials, leaving only the possibility of injunctive relief. In limiting the relief 
permitted against local governments and their officials, Congress implicitly approved the validity of 
antitrust actions against local governments and their officials.  
82 435 U.S. at 413 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (“Since ‘[m]unicipal corporations are instrumentalities 
of the State for the convenient administration of government within their limits,’ the actions of 
municipalities may reflect state policy.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Louisiana ex 
rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883))).  
NASCENZI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 2:46 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
976 
anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as 
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service.”83 The Court 
further defined the need of a locality acting “pursuant to state policy” in 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.84 In Boulder, the Court 
explicitly rejected the proposition that the granting of home rule85 to a 
locality was sufficient to support the proposition that the locality was acting 
“pursuant to state policy.”86 
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,87 the scope of the state action 
doctrine as applied to local governments was further clarified and expanded 
via the adoption of a “foreseeable result” test.88 The Court applied a 
modified form of the Midcal test, which had been articulated five years 
previously. The second prong—whether the state adequately supervises the 
organization—is always deemed fulfilled,89 but the first prong—whether 
the organization is acting in furtherance of a clearly articulated state 
policy—remains open to inquiry. Instead of the requirement that the state 
have a policy to displace competition via regulation or monopolistic public 
services as described in Lafayette, a local government need only be acting 
in a manner that is a “foreseeable result” of the powers granted the local 
government.90 
At issue in Hallie was the City of Eau Claire’s monopolization of 
sewage services. Eau Claire built a sewage treatment facility, and being the 
only such facility in the area, it exercised a monopoly over sewage services 
in general by tying the provision of sewage treatment to the provision of 
sewage collection and transportation services.91 Eau Claire also required 
that the neighboring towns agree to be annexed in order to use the sewage 
 
83 Id.  
84 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
85 Home rule allows for cities to enjoy a limited measure of autonomy. For a more in-depth 
discussion of home rule, see infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text. 
86 455 U.S. at 52–53.  
87 471 U.S. 34 (1985). 
88 See Quinlan, supra note 77, at 26; Bradley S. Copeland, Note, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire: Expanding Antitrust Immunity Under the State Action Exemption, 17 ENVTL. L. 275, 305–06 
(1987).  
89 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47 (“Where the actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is 
involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to further purely 
parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, 
however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy. Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the State to supervise 
actively the municipality’s execution of what is a properly delegated function.”).  
90 Id. at 42. 
91 Id. at 36–37. 
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treatment facility.92 Even though nothing in the state statute authorizing Eau 
Claire to construct sewage facilities directly spoke to anticompetitive 
behavior,93 the Court held that its anticompetitive behavior was exempt 
from liability.94 Thus, no clearly articulated intent on the part of the state to 
authorize anticompetitive behavior on the part of the local government was 
necessary. Instead, anticompetitive behavior need only be a foreseeable 
result of the powers granted to the municipality by the state for the state 
action doctrine to apply. 
The apogee of the “foreseeable result” test as applied to municipal 
immunity to antitrust law came in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc.95 from a divided court.96 At issue in Omni was 
anticompetitive behavior conducted by the City of Columbia, South 
Carolina that granted a single billboard company—Columbia Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. (COA)—a virtual monopoly on billboards in the city.97 
Specifically, city officials used their land use powers to help COA maintain 
its dominant share of the billboard market in Columbia.98 After a state court 
struck down the city’s first attempt to give COA the competitive advantage 
it wanted as unconstitutional, the city enacted an ordinance that passed 
constitutional muster, but still heavily favored COA.99 It introduced spacing 
requirements between billboards, which restricted the areas where Omni 
could build new ones in relation to the billboards already installed by 
COA.100 In holding the anticompetitive behavior on the part of the city 
exempt from antitrust liability, the Court found that the behavior was a 
“foreseeable result” of the zoning powers granted to the city.101 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, stated: 
The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business 
freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of 
competition, particularly on the part of new entrants. A municipal ordinance 
restricting the size, location, and spacing of billboards (surely a common form 
 
92 Id. at 37. 
93 See WIS. STAT. §§ 62.18(1), 66.069(2)(c) (1981–1982). 
94 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.  
95 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
96 The Court was divided 6–3 in favor of immunity for the locality in question. Id. at 384–85. In 
contrast, Hallie was decided unanimously. 471 U.S. at 35.  
97 Omni, 499 U.S. at 367–68.  
98 Id. at 368. 
99 The original ordinance required that every new billboard be approved by the city council. This 
violated the state and federal constitutions on the grounds that it gave too much discretion to the 
council. Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 373.  
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of zoning) necessarily protects existing billboards against some competition 
from newcomers.102 
At particular issue in Omni was the relevance of corruption in holding 
a municipality’s actions exempt from antitrust liability.103 Justice Scalia 
dismissed any concerns of corruption as irrelevant on the basis that 
“virtually all regulation benefits some segments of the society and harms 
others” and refused to substitute the Court’s judgment for that of the city.104 
Justice Scalia derided Omni’s characterization of the new ordinance as a 
“conspiracy,” and instead recast it as an “agreement” that is part of any 
political decision made by a city.105 
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices White and Marshall), however, 
disagreed with the characterization of such agreements.106 Instead, he 
sought to draw a line between actions taken that are “advocated by a 
private lobbyist” and those that “elevate particular private interests over the 
general good.”107 Justice Stevens would have left to juries the determination 
of which side of this line a city’s actions fell, dismissing the majority’s 
“fear that juries are not capable of recognizing the difference.”108 
D. Application of the State Action Doctrine in Phoebe Putney 
Exploring the case law before Phoebe Putney, the history of municipal 
antitrust shows the difficulty of the Court in characterizing municipalities 
as either public or private. Holding municipalities liable for antitrust 
violations in Lafayette and Boulder, the Court deviated from the “creature 
of the state” position that has been the basis of the federal–local 
relationship. It seems as though the Court attempted to return at least 
partially to the “creature of the state” treatment of localities in Hallie by 
expanding antitrust immunity beyond what was intimated in Lafayette and 
Boulder. But, with its application of a modified Midcal test—a test 
designed to analyze the actions of private corporations—the Court betrayed 
an inability to clearly place municipalities on either side of the private–
public divide. The Court still required the demonstration of a state-
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 376. 
104 Id. at 377. 
105 Id. at 375 (“[F]or purposes of the exception, ‘conspiracy’ means nothing more than an 
agreement to impose the regulation in question. Since it is both inevitable and desirable that public 
officials often agree to do what one or another group of private citizens urges upon them, such an 
exception would virtually swallow up the Parker rule: All anticompetitive regulation would be 
vulnerable to a ‘conspiracy’ charge.”). 
106 Id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 395. 
108 Id. at 395–96. 
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articulated policy—the municipality is not fully public—while eliminating 
the need of active state supervision—the municipality is not fully private. 
Omni marked a decided step on the part of six members of the Court 
toward treating the municipality as a fully public entity, applying a rational 
review-like deference to the local government (as it would to state 
legislation109), though the Court’s adherence to the Hallie framework 
showed that the Court was not completely willing to decisively place 
municipalities on the public side of the divide. 
Despite the clarification regarding the state action doctrine and 
municipal governments the Court provided in Hallie and expanded upon in 
Omni, the circuit courts had difficulty applying the “foreseeable result” 
test.110 The tension between the “foreseeability” articulated in Hallie and 
the rejection of broad grants of power (such as home rule charters) as 
sufficient to shield municipalities from antitrust liability in Boulder left the 
lower courts unable to consistently apply the state action doctrine to 
municipalities. Against this uncertainty, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit’s application of a more liberal 
foreseeability test in Phoebe Putney and ultimately decided to apply a 
restrictive form of the state action doctrine to municipalities. 
In defending itself from the FTC’s antitrust claims, the Hospital 
Authority of Albany–Dougherty County did not point merely to the broad 
delegations of the power from the state to support its claim of acting 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.111 It also pointed to the state 
constitutional amendment that authorized the creation of hospital 
authorities.112 The amendment was interpreted by Supreme Court of 
Georgia as being enacted for “[t]he purpose of . . . authoriz[ing] counties 
and municipalities to create an organization which could carry out and 
 
109 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
110 Compare Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 
1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the mere ability to enter into contracts creates the foreseeable 
result of using that contract power in anticompetitive ways), with Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. 
v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to hold the “foreseeable result” 
standard fulfilled merely via the granting of power to contract and enter joint ventures). See also TODD 
J. ZYWICKI ET AL., FTC, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 
25–34 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-
action-task-force/stateactionreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/4JQM-YTCD] (summarizing various circuit 
cases and the inconsistences between them). 
111 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-75(4) (2015) (granting the power to purchase “projects,” which are 
defined by § 31-7-71(5) to include hospitals); id. § 31-7-75(7) (granting the power “[t]o lease . . . for 
operation by others any project”); id. § 31-7-75(10) (granting the power “[t]o establish rates and 
charges for the services and use of the facilities of the authority”). 
112 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007–08 (2013). 
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make more workable the duty which the State owed to its indigent sick.”113 
To that end, the Hospital Authorities Law specified that hospital authorities 
are “deemed to exercise public and essential governmental functions.”114 
The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the district court’s dismissal of the 
FTC’s claims for a failure to state a claim due to the state action doctrine, 
found that anticompetitive behavior was a foreseeable result of the powers 
granted the Authority due to the “impressive breadth” of those powers.115 
The court relied on more than the mere grant of power to purchase and 
operate hospitals and to enter into contracts to support immunity for the 
Authority, noting that the Authority was granted the powers to establish 
rates of service, sue or be sued, own property as a proprietary owner, 
borrow money, and exercise eminent domain.116 Because of these myriad 
powers, the court stated: 
[T]he Georgia legislature must have anticipated anticompetitive harm when it 
authorized hospital acquisitions by the authorities. It defies imagination to 
suppose the legislature could have believed that every geographic market in 
Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the 
authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences.117 
Thus, the court held that the Authority was acting in pursuance of a clearly 
articulated state policy and exempt from antitrust liability.118 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit’s 
application of a more liberal foreseeability test in Phoebe Putney in light of 
lower courts’ inability to consistently apply the state action doctrine to 
municipalities. While the Eleventh Circuit had developed a broad 
conception of the state action doctrine as applied to municipalities, other 
courts adopted stricter standards. Some had injected federalism concerns, 
refusing to recognize municipalities as true state institutions, with some 
arguing that a strict foreseeability test would require states’ grants of 
authority to actively disclaim antitrust immunity.119 
 
113 DeJarnette v. Hosp. Auth. of Albany, 23 S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1942). 
114 Ga. Code Ann. § 31-7-75. 
115 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1376 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1003 (2013). 
116 Id. at 1376–77. 
117 Id. at 1377. 
118 Id. 
119 See, e.g., Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F.3d 231, 236 
(5th Cir. 1999) (“To infer a policy to displace competition from, for example, authority to enter into 
joint ventures or other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be 
required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an instrument of local 
government with power the state did not intend to grant.”). 
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The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, rejecting its 
expansive reading of the state action doctrine and finding that the Hospital 
Authority was not protected by the state action doctrine.120 In reversing the 
Eleventh Circuit, the Court did not only limit the more expansive readings 
of the state action doctrine (i.e., readings that applied the state action 
doctrine solely on the basis of a municipality being granted the power to 
contract or enter a particular market), but circumscribed the availability of 
immunity to municipalities even further. The Court compared the powers 
granted to the Authority to merely “mirror general powers routinely 
conferred by state law upon private corporations,” rejecting the Eleventh 
Circuit’s characterization of them.121 Instead, the Court characterized the 
ability to purchase hospitals as “only a relatively small subset of the 
conduct permitted” by Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law.122 In doing so, 
the Court ignored the special powers granted to the Authority that are 
unavailable to public corporations as irrelevant to whether the Authority 
could “exercise [its] general corporate powers, including their acquisition 
power, without regard to negative effects on competition.”123 Thus, the 
Court analyzed the Hospital Authority as more analogous to a private 
corporation than a public government entity, and greatly circumscribed 
municipalities’ ability to exercise police power to provide for the general 
welfare of its people. 
III. THE IMPACT OF PHOEBE PUTNEY ON THE ABILITY OF STATES TO 
EXERCISE THEIR GOVERNMENTAL POWERS THROUGH MUNICIPALITIES 
Part II showed that the real debate in the application of the state action 
doctrine to municipalities is better understood as an analysis of whether the 
municipality is considered a private or public entity. In Phoebe Putney, the 
Court decided that a municipality providing healthcare by purchasing 
hospitals was not an exerciser of governmental power, but more akin to a 
private corporation. Thus, the Supreme Court impeded the ability of states 
to exercise their governmental powers through municipalities by limiting 
how states can delegate powers to them. 
The basis of all state power is the so-called police power, which is 
generally stated to be the power to provide for the health, safety, and 
 
120 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 
121 Id. at 1011. 
122 Id. at 1014. 
123 Id. at 1014–15. In contrast, the Court distinguished Omni—which held that the exercise of 
zoning powers was exempt from antitrust liability even when anticompetitive effects result—by 
describing “displace[ment of] unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of 
preventing normal acts of competition” as inherent to zoning. Id. at 1013 (quoting City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991)). 
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morals of a state’s residents or citizens.124 The police power is, however, 
reserved to the states, without regard to the existence of local 
governments.125 In theory, the states should be able to delegate that power 
to subdivisions of itself, such as to municipalities, which exist solely as part 
of state law, having no existence in the federal system. Through over one 
hundred years of lawmaking, states have shaped the boundaries of local 
government power and those boundaries have not always remained the 
same. However, with Phoebe Putney, the Court has impeded the process of 
determining the rightful powers of municipalities and instead forced upon 
the states its own conception of which powers are properly local and which 
must be retained by the states qua states. Part III will first trace the broad 
developments of local government law in the United States and then 
discuss Phoebe Putney as an intrusion by the federal government into this 
area of purely state law that limits the ability of states to determine the 
correct division of power between state and local governments. 
A. The Development of Contemporary Municipal Law 
The most significant development in municipal law is the shift from 
Dillon’s Rule to home rule, which is also the clearest example to 
demonstrate the proposition that the division of power between state and 
local governments has not remained constant. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, John F. Dillon articulated the theory of local government 
expressed in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh in what came to be known as 
Dillon’s Rule.126 Not only did it espouse the conception of the local 
government as merely a creature of the state that created it by declaring 
local governments only have the powers granted them expressly by the 
state, but it also sought to limit local government power even further, 
requiring that the powers expressly granted to municipal corporations be 
 
124 Various formulas of what the police power entails can be found in various sources. See, e.g., 
Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “police power” as “[t]he inherent 
and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the public security, 
order, health, morality, and justice”); Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 
375 (1921) (defining “police powers” as those that broadly “relate to the safety, health, morals and 
general welfare of the public”). 
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” (emphasis 
added)). While perhaps an argument that the Tenth Amendment also provides that these powers are 
reserved “to the people” and thus to some division of government smaller than the states, the 
amendment has never been interpreted that way. For a discussion of this interpretation of the Tenth 
Amendment, see Jake Sullivan, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935 
(2003).  
126 Frug, supra note 27, at 1109. 
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construed narrowly.127 While Dillon’s Rule was originally articulated as a 
description of contemporary municipal law, it became the law.128 In fact, 
Dillon’s Rule became the default rule of local government law in the 
United States, affecting even the treatment of local governments in states 
where it has been expressly rejected.129 
Those unsatisfied by the limitations placed on local governments due 
to Dillon’s Rule have formulated two major means to counteract the rule 
and create more opportunity for self-determination and self-governance at 
the local level. The first attempt was the prohibition against local or special 
legislation.130 Laws preventing local or special legislation prevent states 
from passing legislation specifically targeted at particular municipalities.131 
In this way, it seeks to reduce the state’s ability to interfere with local 
governments. This prohibition, however, has become almost completely 
ineffective and instead merely survives as a drafting guide for state 
legislatures.132 So long as laws are written in general terms, they are seen as 
not violating the prohibition, even if only one locality would ever be 
affected by the legislation.133 Thus, the prohibition on local or special 
legislation, while in theory running contrary to Dillon’s Rule, in fact 
meshes quite neatly with it. It does nothing to expand the power or 
autonomy of local governments, and it does not challenge the basic 
 
127 JOHN F. DILLON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 237 (5th ed. 
1911); see also Frug, supra note 27, at 1109–12; Note, Dillon’s Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 693, 693–94 (1982). 
128 Dillon’s Rule has also been interpreted as a reflection of contemporary distrust of local politics 
and the corruption of local government. Frug, supra note 27, at 1109–10. 
129 FRUG ET AL., supra note 39, at 148–49. 
130 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2286–87 (2003). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 2288. 
133 See 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 3:31, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 
2015). For example, in Pennsylvania, the legislature has divided its cities into classes based on 
population. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (2015). First-class cities are defined as having more than 
one million residents. Id. Second-class cities are defined as having between 250,000 and one million 
residents. Id. The effect of this tier system is to make Philadelphia the only first-class city and 
Pittsburgh the only second-class city. See PA. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATOR’S 
MUNICIPAL DESKBOOK 16–17 (4th ed. 2014), http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/Reports/deskbook14/
complete_fourth_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6W5-A949]. Thus, if the state legislature wants to 
target either of those two cities with a specific piece of legislation, it need only write the legislation to 
affect all first- or second-class cities. See MARTINEZ, supra, at § 3:31. Less complicated schemes are 
also effective. See, e.g., Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. 
1985) (holding that because the legislation at issue was drafted in general terms, there was no violation 
of Illinois’s prohibition on special legislation despite the legislation at issue being clearly tailored to, 
and only affecting, Wrigley Field); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 19 (La. 2001) 
(holding that there was no violation of Louisiana’s prohibition on local or special legislation when the 
legislation at issue could only ever affect New Orleans’s suit against firearm manufacturers, which was 
contemporaneously working its way through the courts, because it was drafted in general terms).  
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principle of Dillon’s Rule that localities are completely subservient to the 
state. 
In contrast, the home rule initiative is a fundamental rejection of 
Dillon’s Rule and has been moderately successful at creating local 
autonomy.134 Home rule has two components: initiative and immunity.135 
Initiative is the essential feature of home rule. Instead of requiring a 
specific grant of power the way Dillon’s Rule dictates, localities are 
granted power to create legislation in broader fields. Immunity goes further 
than mere initiative, preventing the state from overriding decisions made by 
localities. In this way, immunity is the only real source of true autonomy in 
American municipal law.136 
However, as with all local government in the federal system as 
construed along the lines of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, home rule 
initiatives must be enacted by the states in order for a local government to 
benefit from them. Some states have created home rule via statute,137 while 
others have written it into their constitutions,138 giving greater protection to 
home rule powers and more closely mirroring the position of the states 
within the federal system. But in both the federal–state relationship and the 
state–locality relationship, the state is the source of the general police 
power.139 Thus, the federal government only has the powers granted to it by 
the Constitution, and home rule localities only have the powers given to 
them by the state’s home rule law, whether it is by statute or constitution.140 
 
134 See Frug, supra note 27, at 1062–63. 
135 For a discussion of varying conceptions of these two powers, see generally Barron, supra note 
130. 
136 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1990). 
137 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.082 (West 2015); Home Rule Act of 1917, ch. 152, 1917 N.J. 
Laws 319 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:42 to :62 (West 2015)). 
138 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5; MINN. CONST. art XII, § 4; MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19. 
139 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
140 However, even within the context of home rule, there are various restrictions on local 
government power. First, with regard to initiative power, localities have to show that their initiatives 
fall within the contours of the home rule powers given them. See Barron, supra note 130, at 2347–48. 
There are also various general exceptions to home rule initiative that can greatly limit the power of 
localities, depending on how the exceptions are construed. See id. at 2347. These exceptions include 
anything preempted by the state (i.e., the locality cannot act where the state already has), anything of 
statewide concern, and private law. All of these exceptions do not have clear borders, and judges can 
have a large impact on the extent of a locality’s home rule power merely by characterizing challenged 
legislation one way or another. Second, not all states that have home rule grant immunity to their 
localities, and as with the initiative power, immunity powers must still fall within the contours of the 
home rule powers given to localities. Also, as with initiative, there is a general exception for issues of 
statewide concern. See Frug, supra note 27, at 1117. The border between issues of statewide and local 
concern is again an ill-defined one, leaving the true extent of the home rule powers enjoyed by localities 
with immunity subject to judges’ characterizations of their actions. 
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The progression from Dillon’s Rule to home rule shows a progression 
in states’ attempts to shape local government law and the ways in which the 
state police power is exercised through its municipalities. The realm of 
powers given to local governments has not remained constant and is not 
consistent among the states. 
B. Phoebe Putney as an Intrusion into State-Made Local Government Law 
Despite the history of American local government law and the 
attempts by states to shape the contours of local government power, in 
Phoebe Putney and its application of the state action doctrine, the Court 
implicitly denied the ability of states to delegate certain powers to 
municipalities even if the power in question gets to the heart of the state’s 
police power to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 
This Section analyzes the ways in which the Court’s approach to the state 
action doctrine in Phoebe Putney affects local government law. 
1. Limiting the Powers Municipalities Can Exercise.—The most 
direct implication of the Court’s approach to the state action doctrine in 
Phoebe Putney is a limitation on the powers municipalities can exercise. 
The Court disregarded the governmental character of services provided by 
the local government-created corporation at issue. The court painted the 
Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty County broadly, treating it as an 
ordinary corporation and focusing on its “general corporate powers.”141 The 
closest the court got to analyzing the governmental nature of the Hospital 
Authority was an analysis of the powers granted to hospital authorities that 
have a governmental character, rather than the goals of the state legislature 
in authorizing its creation.142 Acknowledging the Hospital Authority’s 
argument that it was “granted unique powers and responsibilities to fulfill 
the State’s objective of providing all residents with access to adequate and 
affordable health and hospital care,”143 the Court declined to seriously 
consider the clear goal of the Georgia Legislature to empower local 
governments to provide for the healthcare of their residents. Instead, the 
 
141 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1015 (2013) (“We have no doubt that 
Georgia’s hospital authorities differ materially from private corporations that offer hospital services. 
But nothing in the Law or any other provision of Georgia law clearly articulates a state policy to allow 
authorities to exercise their general corporate powers, including their acquisition power, without regard 
to negative effects on competition.”). 
142 See id. To be sure, the Court acknowledged the legislative objectives of the Hospital Authorities 
Law, but failed to use these objectives to inform the governmental character of the Authority. The 
legislative objectives were used only to determine whether the Authority’s actions were a foreseeable 
result from those objectives. See id. 
143 See id. at 1014. 
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Court focused exclusively on the grants (e.g., eminent domain) and 
limitations (e.g., nonprofit status) of power given to hospital authorities.144 
As discussed at the beginning of this Part, in theory, states should be 
able to delegate the police power to subdivisions of itself, and in the case of 
Phoebe Putney, the Georgia Constitution provides that “the General 
Assembly may . . . authorize local governments . . . to exercise police 
powers which do not conflict with general laws.”145 While the Hospital 
Authorities Law does not explicitly state that it is conferring any general 
police power to hospital authorities, the hospital authorities created 
pursuant to the law must necessarily be exercising some portion of the 
state’s retained police power. At issue is merely the scope of that power. 
Given that health is a traditional concern of a state’s police powers, that 
hospital authorities by definition are concerned with health, and that the 
Hospital Authorities Law was enacted specifically to serve the purpose of 
improving the health of Georgia’s citizens, it would be hard to imagine the 
Court’s decision in Phoebe Putney as anything other than federal antitrust 
law impinging on a state’s power to regulate its own economy. 
While the Court cast its argument in terms of the foreseeability of 
hospital authorities to use their powers to pursue anticompetitive behaviors, 
it did not convincingly distinguish the supposed unforeseeability of Phoebe 
Putney with the supposed foreseeability of Hallie or Omni. Perhaps in 
Hallie a genuine foreseeability argument can be made to justify the 
application of the state action doctrine.146 But in Omni, it seems no more 
feasible that the state foresaw and thus intended a broad grant of zoning 
powers to local governments be used to enable a private company to 
establish a billboard monopoly. Instead, the most logical distinction 
between Phoebe Putney on one hand and Hallie and Omni on the other is 
not the foreseeability of the anticompetitive behavior, as the Court claimed, 
but rather the nature of the government services provided in each instance. 
It seems as though the Court is uncomfortable with the allocation to 
local governments of anything other than those powers traditionally seen as 
the purview of local governments. Sewage systems (Hallie) have been 
traditionally controlled by local governments and seen as a purely local 
 
144 See id. at 1015. 
145 GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, ¶ 4(a). 
146 See Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 314 N.W.2d 321, 324–25 (Wis. 1982) (finding a 
broad ability of local governments to only provide sewage services to areas within their municipal 
boundaries and to condition the provision of such services to outlying areas upon annexation). 
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government function,147 and there is no more paradigmatic local 
government power than zoning (Omni), aside from perhaps education.148 
Such a reading of Phoebe Putney becomes even more plausible in 
light of the current national attitude towards healthcare. If there is no more 
paradigmatic local government concern than zoning, healthcare is quickly 
becoming viewed as a paradigmatically “big” problem.149 Indeed, 
healthcare has gained such prominence on the national stage that the 
Obama Administration’s biggest impact on the legislative landscape of the 
United States will likely be the Affordable Care Act (ACA),150 which deals 
with healthcare concerns on a national level.151 At the very least, by 
providing that states may set up their own health insurance exchanges 
instead of participating in a national exchange,152 the ACA shows that 
healthcare is at least a state-level, if not a national-level, concern. In 
Phoebe Putney, the Court seems to have fully embraced this view of 
healthcare by overriding Georgia’s valid policy choice of delegating power 
over healthcare to its localities.153 
 
147 Briffault, supra note 136, at 15 (noting the role of local governments in the development of 
sewage services in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in 
Hallie reasoned that the state supervision prong of the Midcal test did not apply in this case in part 
because sewage is a “traditional municipal function.” Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 
376, 384 (7th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that state supervision over traditional municipal functions “would 
erode the concept of local autonomy”). 
148 Briffault, supra note 136, at 3 (“[E]ducation and zoning are the principal operations of local 
governments.”); see also Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing to 
decide whether the state supervision prong of the Midcal test applied when a local government 
exercised powers outside of traditional municipal functions since the power at issue—zoning—“is a 
traditional governmental function designed to protect public health and safety”). 
149 See, e.g., Wasif Ali Khan, Accountable Care Organizations: A Response to Critical Voices, 
14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 338 (2012) (“It is unequivocally true that subpar healthcare quality 
is a national issue.”); Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical 
Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 491 (2012) (“[H]ealthcare and its associated 
costs have become national issues . . . .”). 
150 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
151 See J.J. Feinauer, What Will Obama’s Legacy Be?, DESERET NEWS (Oct. 30 2014), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865614302/What-will-Obamas-legacy-be.html [http://perma.cc/
3UDZ-EQXJ] (“[The Affordable Care Act is] largely considered to be Obama’s signature legislation.”). 
152 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2665 (2012). 
153 In light of the antitrust setting of Phoebe Putney, it is also interesting to note that much of the 
scheme of the Affordable Care Act is couched in promoting competition in the healthcare market. See 
Megan Slack, Affordable Care Act Increases Insurance Choices, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 30, 2013, 
12:46 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/05/30/affordable-care-act-increases-insurance-
choices [http://perma.cc/KBL8-CFRX]. While the focus of the Act is increasing competition between 
insurance providers (not hospitals), the general emphasis on competition could perhaps explain the 
application of antitrust laws in Phoebe Putney in spite of the state action doctrine. 
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If Phoebe Putney is properly understood as pigeonholing local 
government antitrust immunity into only areas of traditional local 
government concern, the Court is denying local governments a rightful 
place in the American federal system. Since the state action doctrine is 
based on the power of a state to regulate its own economy, which is an 
inherent part of the police power enjoyed by the states, such an 
interpretation of the antitrust exemption would be an implicit denial of a 
general local governmental role in economic regulation, regardless of the 
powers granted to localities by the state. Localities cannot be given broad 
autonomy via home rule due to Boulder, and can only act in pursuance of 
narrowly circumscribed state-articulated policies due to Phoebe Putney. 
2. Stifling Local Government Innovation.—Local government 
innovation will be stifled if local governments are only allowed to exercise 
governmental functions in areas of traditional local concern. While it has 
been argued that states themselves have stifled local government 
innovation,154 Supreme Court jurisprudence that limits the governmental 
character of municipalities will only further stifle such innovation. 
Ironically, this historical-based approach to which powers local 
governments can truly exercise ignores the history of innovation by local 
governments. As Professor Richard Briffault has noted, local governments 
have provided myriad innovations in public services, despite legal 
restrictions on their power: 
Even during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the heyday of 
Dillon’s Rule, the era of plenary state power and the unsteady beginnings of 
home rule—American city governments pioneered in public health, education, 
parks, libraries, water supply, sanitation and sewage removal, street paving 
and lighting and mass transit, building the infrastructure that still serves 
modern urban centers.155 
It seems odd, therefore, to rely on a preconception of valid local 
government power to determine the application of antitrust laws. Such a 
distinction becomes even more puzzling considering the history of 
hospitals as institutions themselves. Public hospitals have been present in 
the United States since at least the 1730s and were of local concern since 
their inception.156 Originally intended to provide medical care for only the 
poor and indigent, they eventually became providers of medical care to the 
 
154 See, e.g., GERALD FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION (2008).  
155 Briffault, supra note 136, at 15. 
156 Lewis R. Goldfrank, The Public Hospital, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 708 (1997). 
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entire community.157 Thus, hospitals and healthcare have traditionally been 
of local concern. Accordingly, it seems incongruous to strip local 
governments of the power to provide healthcare for its residents merely 
because of the increasing focus on healthcare as a national concern. 
3. The Unanimity of Phoebe Putney.—Also striking in Phoebe 
Putney is the unanimity of the decision. No prior Supreme Court decision 
holding that a local government violated federal antitrust law had ever been 
decided unanimously. Lafayette, which was the initial case to find that local 
governments are subject to federal antitrust laws, was decided only by a 
plurality decision, and four Justices dissented.158 Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor, dissented in Boulder.159 In 
both cases, the dissenting Justices expressed concern for the erosion of 
municipalities’ status as governmental bodies.160 Perhaps even more 
striking is that Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Omni, 
joined with the rest of the court in finding the Hospital Authority of 
Albany–Dougherty County subject to federal antitrust law. In Omni, Justice 
Scalia rejected the idea that local government actions should be subjected 
to any more scrutiny than actions taken directly by the state.161 It is true that 
both Omni and Phoebe Putney were supposedly decided on the question of 
foreseeability and did not explicitly rely on any sort of inquiry into the 
nature of the actions taken by the local governments, and thus are 
reconcilable. However, as noted above, the standard of foreseeability seems 
to be much more narrowly construed than in Omni, and it is difficult to 
explain this narrowness on grounds other than the character of the local 
government’s actions.162 
 
157 See id. at 708. 
158 City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 390 (1978). 
159 Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 41 (1982). 
160 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The petitioners are governmental bodies, 
not private persons, and their actions are ‘act[s] of government’ which . . . are not subject to the 
Sherman Act.”); Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court treats a political 
subdivision of a State as an entity indistinguishable from any privately owned business.”). 
161 499 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1991) (rejecting the suggestion that there be a “conspiracy exception” to 
the state action doctrine). 
162 Despite the unanimity of the decision and the unclear application of the foreseeability test, it is 
conceivable that Phoebe Putney does not signal a notable shift in the Court’s view of local government. 
While the Court explicitly declined to characterize the Hospital Authority’s actions as proprietary and 
not governmental, FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 n.4, 1011 n.5 (2013) 
(refusing to consider the creation of a “market participant” exception to the state action doctrine 
because the issue was not raised by the parties as well as refusing to consider whether the Hospital 
Authority is properly a governmental subdivision or a private corporation), it is conceivable that the 
means used by the Hospital Authority influenced the Court’s characterization of its actions as 
unforeseeable by the state. The Hospital Authority created private nonprofit corporations to manage the 
hospitals, id. at 1008, which makes the anticompetitive behavior challenged by the FTC seem much less 
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4. Resulting Lack of Clarity.—The uneven application of the 
foreseeability test seen in the divergence between Phoebe Putney and Omni 
and the seeming reliance on character of the action at issue will create a 
lack of clarity as to exactly when the state action doctrine applies to 
municipalities. Within state law, local governments already suffer from a 
sort of paralysis: unsure of whether they have been empowered by the state 
to take a certain action, they often opt for the safer path of not acting.163 
Adding uncertainty surrounding the application of federal law to local 
governments, it is only natural that additional paralysis will result. Given 
the lack of clarity of the foreseeability test in the application of the state 
action doctrine to local governments, local governments will be unsure of 
whether their actions will violate federal antitrust laws and thus will tend 
closer towards simply choosing not to act. Even more uncertainty is created 
by pigeonholing the analysis into the foreseeability test and declining to 
clarify whether the nature of the governmental subdivision in question or 
the nature of its actions impacts the state action doctrine analysis. 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, the Court seems to be ensuring that municipalities’ 
relationship with the private–public distinction always gives municipalities 
the short end of the stick. As seen in Phoebe Putney, treating municipalities 
as private in character can have severe limits on the ability of 
municipalities to exercise their state-given powers. Nonetheless, some 
commentators have advocated shaping municipalities more along the lines 
of ordinary corporations to increase city power.164 Similarly, some 
reformers who helped implement the concept of home rule reject the 
“creature of the state” concept of local government in favor of a return to 
its private corporate origins.165 Indeed, if municipalities were private 
 
governmental in character. Furthermore, the Court suggested that Georgia merely granted the Hospital 
Authority “simple permission to play in [the] market.” Id. at 1013 (quoting Kay Elec. Coop. v. 
Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2011)). If the Hospital Authority was only given “simple 
permission to play in [the] market,” it would be difficult to describe the Authority as anything other 
than a proprietary actor. Even taking a narrow view of the holding in Phoebe Putney, however, does not 
completely mitigate the negative impact on local government powers. As discussed above in 
Section III.A, state law has often been unclear as to the contours of local government power, with the 
legality of a local ordinance sometimes turning on a judge’s characterization of the ordinance as of local 
or statewide concern. 
163 See David J. Barron et al., Dispelling the Myth of Home Rule: Local Power in Greater Boston 
9–12 (2004), http://www.celdf.org/downloads/Mass.%20-%20Dispelling%20the%20Myth%20of%
20Home%20Rule%20in%20Mass.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZUS-9NHB]. 
164 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 27, at 1141–49. 
165 See Barron, supra note 130, at 2300. 
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corporations instead of creatures of the state, constitutional due process 
protections would protect them from uncompensated takings by the state. 
Instead, municipalities suffer the worst of both worlds. Municipalities have 
retained the vulnerability of the corporation from the charter system, but 
are still unable to fully act as government entities. States can abolish 
municipalities at will as “creatures of the state,” yet municipalities do not 
always enjoy the immunities and powers of the state, being subject to 
general federal law as if they were private corporations. 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PHOEBE PUTNEY 
The best solution to the paralyzing effects of uncertainty in the 
application of the state action doctrine to local governments would be for 
the Court to overturn Boulder. Overturning Boulder and allowing broader 
grants of power—such as the granting of a home rule charter—to allow 
municipalities to enjoy the benefits of the state action doctrine would 
recognize a valid role of local governments in the American federal system. 
Additionally, any potential danger of local governments exercising more 
power than intended by the state would be mitigated by the full recognition 
of local governments as creatures of the state, existing and exercising any 
power merely at the whim of the state. 
It could be argued that purely legislative control over the contours of 
local government power would be too unwieldy to be effective, especially 
given the near universal bans on special legislation that targets specific 
localities, and that states need to be able to police those contours via 
litigation the way that Georgia did in Phoebe Putney. This is incorrect, 
however, for two fundamental reasons. First, as discussed in Part III,166 
bans on special legislation are largely ineffective, and any barriers they 
create are easily overcome by carefully drafting a piece of “general” 
legislation. Second, analogizing to the relationship between the federal 
government and states should mitigate any concerns. While not always 
without friction or disputes over the contours of each other’s powers, the 
federal–state relationship shows that multiple tiers of government can 
function together and successfully govern.167 
Also, one might argue that if Boulder were overturned, a different 
kind of Midcal test would have to be applied when analyzing the state 
action doctrine as applied to local governments. Instead of only applying 
the clearly articulated state policy prong, perhaps courts should instead 
apply a modified version of the state supervision prong. This prong was set 
 
166 See supra Section III.A. 
167 See supra note 25. 
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aside in applying the state action doctrine to local governments due to the 
public nature of municipalities.168 Thus, should Boulder be overturned, the 
Court’s inquiry might shift to the nature of municipality at issue and 
whether it is suitably public. 
This inquiry would become equally fraught and unclear as the current 
application of the state action doctrine to localities.169 Additionally, because 
there is no federal law of what constitutes a valid local government, any 
such analysis of a municipality would have to turn on state law. If not, then 
the evil demonstrated in Phoebe Putney would again rear its head: the 
Supreme Court would be the arbiter of what powers can “validly” be 
delegated to local governments, and the ability of states to experiment and 
develop local government law will be stifled and unreasonably boxed into 
areas that have been thought of traditionally as of local concern.170 Indeed, 
the Court would be going even further than the evil demonstrated in 
Phoebe Putney. Any attempt by the Court to define what is and is not a city 
(or any other form of municipality) would even more broadly stifle the 
states’ ability to shape the structure of its municipalities. 
Illinois has gone down the path of explicitly delegating its state action 
immunity to its home rule municipalities and has provided what might be a 
somewhat viable stopgap solution to Phoebe Putney.171 The Illinois 
Municipal Code explicitly states that “[i]t is the intention of the General 
Assembly that the ‘State action exemption’ to the application of federal 
antitrust statutes be fully available to all municipalities.”172 Enacted in 
1983,173 it has been rarely invoked, and its status, therefore, is unclear given 
the developments of Omni and Phoebe Putney. In fact, it could be argued 
 
168 See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (“Where the actor is a 
municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement.”). 
169 Further analogizing to the federal–state relationship, should courts change tack and take a fully 
consistent view of localities as creatures of the state, they might be hesitant to delve into what 
constitutes a sufficiently public institution to be considered truly governmental in the way that courts 
have refused to evaluate state governments, despite the Guarantee Clause. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962) (“The Court has . . . refused to resort to the Guaranty Clause . . . as the source 
of a constitutional standard for invalidating state action.”). Especially given the general weakness of the 
nondelegation doctrine and the creation of local governments by exercise of a state’s sovereignty, it 
would seem improbable that a court would find within its power the ability to invalidate any such 
delegations. 
170 See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47 (implying that antitrust immunity can be applied to municipalities 
when acting in “execution of what is a properly delegated function”). 
171 Such a stopgap solution might be the best practical solution available since the unanimity of the 
decision in Phoebe Putney seemingly indicates that any overturning of Boulder is, at best, remote for 
the foreseeable future. 
172 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-1-10 (2014). 
173 See Pub. Act. 83-929, § 9, 1983 ILL. LAWS 6061–62; see also Pub. Act 84-1050, §§ 1–2, 
1985 ILL. LAWS 6949–52 (amending the 1983 act). 
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that its status was unclear even in light of Hallie and Boulder, which seem 
to be the impetus for the statute’s original enactment.174 
A search of published cases reveals only five that give any treatment 
to the antitrust provisions of the statute.175 None of these cases, however, 
directly address the reach of this general extension of the state action 
doctrine to municipalities, but merely use the statute to buttress the 
application of the doctrine to the case at hand.176 For example, in Campbell 
v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit applied the foreseeability test from 
Hallie, and then only briefly mentioned Illinois’s express extension of the 
state action doctrine as “support[ing]” the foreseeability of the 
anticompetitive activity in question.177 
Accordingly, it is unclear whether such a provision would have 
protected the Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty County in Phoebe 
Putney had Georgia pursued the same path as Illinois. If local governments 
are truly creatures of the state, presumably the reasoning of Parker that 
“nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests 
that its purpose was to restrain a state”178 would permit the state to fully 
immunize its municipalities. At the same time, given the Supremacy 
Clause,179 it seems odd that a state would be able to modify the reach of 
federal antitrust laws.180 While unclear as to whether such a statute would 
survive a direct review by the Supreme Court, it seems as though such state 
legislation is the easiest way for local governments to create a stopgap 
solution to Phoebe Putney and enjoy immunity from antitrust interference 
in the exercise of their governmental powers. 
 
174 See Thomas W. Kelty, Anti-Trust Immunity Expanded: The Impact of House Bill 521, ILL. 
MUN. REV., Nov. 1985, at 13–14. 
175 These five cases are: Campbell v. City of Chicago, 823 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Lathrop v. Juneau & Assocs., 220 F.R.D. 330, 336 (S.D. Ill. 2004); Charles Fiore Nurseries, Inc. v. 
Village of Long Grove, No. 86 C 2339, 1986 WL 10372, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1986); Wellwoods 
Dev. Co. v. City of Aurora, 631 F. Supp. 221, 226–27 (N.D. Ill. 1986); and Richard Hoffman Corp. v. 
Integrated Bldg. Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 367, 372 (1984). 
176 See, e.g., Lathrop, 220 F.R.D. at 336. 
177 Campbell, 823 F.2d at 1185 (“Therefore, the Illinois General Assembly’s passage of ¶ 1–1–10 
supports the proposition that the state legislature intended reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive acts 
from its grant of power to municipalities.”). 
178 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
179 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
180 It should also be noted that Justice Rehnquist’s view of the state action doctrine as applied to 
municipalities—that it should be properly analyzed under the Supremacy Clause to determine whether a 
municipality’s actions are preempted by federal antitrust law, rather than as an exemption to federal 
antitrust law—was rejected by the court in Boulder. See Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 
455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
In refusing to apply the state action doctrine to the Hospital Authority 
of Albany–Dougherty County in Phoebe Putney, the Supreme Court once 
again failed to consistently treat local governments in the American federal 
system as true creatures of the state, despite its forceful pronouncement in 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh. Though conceivably limited in scope, the 
unanimity of the decision seems to signal a strong shift toward treating 
local governments less like public governmental entities and more like 
private corporations. The Court should have overturned Boulder, which 
would have created greater clarity for municipal governments and 
recognized their role as governmental bodies. As creatures of the state, the 
contours of their power should be determined by state law without the 
interference of federal law. As a stopgap solution, the best way for local 
governments to create clarity in the field and provide greater space for 
them to carry out their functions is to lobby their states to pass legislation 
along the lines of Illinois’s explicit extension of the state action doctrine to 
municipalities. 
 
